Context matters in the debate over MSU’s athletic future

The other day, I wrote an article laying out both sides of the current discussion at Michigan State.

On Wednesday night, Nolan Finley of The Detroit News published an opinion column focused heavily on the transparency concerns surrounding Spartan Media Ventures, while leaving out much of the structural and funding context driving the decision.

Finley’s column hinges on the premise that the creation of Spartan Media Ventures represents a surrender of public control and a deliberate effort to evade transparency. While that framing is emotionally powerful, it is not necessarily accurate.

First, the authority question is more complex than Finley suggests. University presidents and athletic directors routinely operate affiliated entities – foundations, licensing arms, research corporations, real estate holding companies, and broadcast partnerships – under board-approved umbrella structures.

Nearly every major public university has a separately incorporated foundation that raises and manages vast sums of money outside the core university budget. Research institutions commercialize patents through separate corporations. Athletic departments outsource multimedia rights and sponsorship sales to private partners.

These structures exist because public universities operate in two worlds at once. They are public institutions subject to oversight, and they are economic enterprises competing in markets that move at private-sector speed.

Boards approve strategy and delegate execution authority while executives build the vehicles to carry that strategy out. That division of responsibility is how complex public institutions function.

As I mentioned in my first article, a couple members of MSU's Board of Trustees and MSU's administration are having a substantive discussion about where the lines of review and oversight should be drawn. That is a good thing, in my opinion.

If the Board authorized Spartan Ventures to expand and monetize the commercial value of Michigan State athletics – which it did – then forming a subsidiary designed to raise capital is an execution step within that framework. Boards do not negotiate capital structures or sponsorship contracts line by line. They set direction, leadership implements the details.

Second, confidentiality is not the same as secrecy. In his column, Finley treats non-disclosure agreements as evidence of wrongdoing. In reality, NDAs are standard in private capital transactions. If MSU is raising money in a competitive NIL-driven environment, publicly disclosing valuations, investor terms, or strategic plans in real time would weaken, if not eliminate, its negotiating leverage.

It should be noted that trustees can still review information under controlled conditions. They can use that information when they cast their votes. Oversight does not require public release of proprietary data. The actions of past trustees at Michigan State have shown that NDAs in this situation are not an outrageous control measure, they are learning from the past.

Third, the ownership narrative is seemingly overstated. Selling 11% of a revenue-focused entity is not selling Spartan sports. The university still owns its teams, trademarks, facilities, and academic mission. What is being monetized is future revenue – media rights, sponsorship inventory, branding opportunities. That is a financial structure, not a transfer of institutional control.

Fourth, the funding question deserves more attention than Finley gives it. If not private capital, then what? Increased student fees? Greater reliance on taxpayer appropriations? Direct subsidies from the university’s general fund?

There are only so many ways to fund modern college athletics. Either private investors share in the risk (and the upside if it happens), or students and taxpayers absorb more of the cost. As a conservative voice in the state of Michigan, Finley has often argued for limiting taxpayer exposure and encouraging private-sector solutions. This structure does exactly that. It invites outside capital to shoulder risk rather than placing that burden on Michigan taxpayers. In my opinion, you cannot reject public funding and private investment at the same time. One of those sources has to fund the escalating economics of college sports.

Fifth, the liability argument cuts both ways. A properly structured private entity can insulate the university from certain financial risks tied to commercial activity. That is one reason institutions across the country are experimenting with hybrid governance models in the NIL and media-rights era.

Finally, the competitive reality cannot be ignored. College athletics no longer operates under a purely public funding model. It is a hybrid marketplace shaped by NIL collectives, media valuations, and outside investment. If Michigan State refused to adapt, it would be accused of negligence, complacency, and surrendering competitiveness.

The real debate is not transparency versus corruption. It is how a public university competes in a commercial environment without overexposing taxpayers or students to financial risk. Finley frames adaptation as betrayal; others see it as a pragmatic effort to survive in a system that has already changed.